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Abstract
Network-based intervention strategies can be effective and cost-efficient approaches to
curtailing harmful contagions in myriad settings. As studied, these strategies are often
impractical to implement, as they typically assume complete knowledge of the network
structure, which is unusual in practice. In this paper, we investigate how different
immunization strategies perform under realistic conditions — where the strategies are
informed by partially-observed network data. Our results suggest that global
immunization strategies, like degree immunization, are optimal in most cases; the
exception is at very high levels of missing data, where stochastic strategies, like
acquaintance immunization, begin to outstrip them in minimizing outbreaks. Stochastic
strategies are more robust in some cases due to the different ways in which they can be
affected by missing data. In fact, one of our proposed variants of acquaintance
immunization leverages a logistically-realistic ongoing survey-intervention process as a
form of targeted data-recovery to improve with increasing levels of missing data. These
results support the effectiveness of targeted immunization as a general practice. They
also highlight the risks of considering networks as idealized mathematical objects:
overestimating the accuracy of network data and foregoing the rewards of additional
inquiry.
Author summary
It is often useful to track how epidemics spread through populations by mapping
transmissions between people, communities, and cities. This consideration of a
population as a network can reveal the critical players, locations, or events driving
epidemics. Similarly, by mapping the network of possible transmissions before an
outbreak occurs, we can identify potentially critical actors on which public health
interventions should focus. Unfortunately, the data collection process required to map
all possible interactions of a population is difficult— fraught with possible error and
unlikely to be complete. To understand the role of data quality in network-based
interventions, we apply different strategies to partially-observed networks with
controllable amounts of missing data. Our results suggest that intervention strategies
which require full network information remain fairly effective up to high levels of
missing data. However, local strategies which rely only on small data samples can
outperform the more data-expensive benchmark strategies when little data is available.
Surprisingly, we also propose an intervention that improves in effectiveness with less
data by coupling targeted immunization with targeted data recovery. These results
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show that insights from network science can be robust to missing data, but that their
implementation should be adjusted for noisy real-world applications.
Introduction
The spread of infectious diseases [1], computer viruses [2], and “fake news” [3] pose
serious threats to the health and well-being of an increasingly connected society. Thus,
one of the most important questions in public health and network science is how to
curtail contagions. If dangerous contagious pathogens or content spread over network
connections, what kinds of interventions will be most effective at inhibiting outbreak
size [4–9]? For example, prior work has shown that when the population’s contact
structure can be modeled as a complex network, immunization (broadly defined) of
certain actors can prevent contagion considerably more effectively than randomized
immunization [10–21]. With targeted immunization, actors are immunized based on
their potential role in future outbreaks, which is determined by their position in a
contact network [22,23]. More applied work has demonstrated the utility of network
based intervention [24]. For example, researchers have leveraged network properties to
maximize the impact of their interventions in a diverse set of contexts including
smoking interventions in schools [25], HIV spread among men who have sex with men
(MSM) [26], and disease spread in needle sharing networks [27].
Here, the term “immunization” refers to anything that reduces the probability of
infection to zero for a particular actor for the entire duration of a particular
“contagion”. In practice, this could be a vaccine, but other interventions, such as
rehabilitation or pre-exposure prophylaxis, could also conceivably permanently reduce
risk of infection at near 100% effectiveness. Targeted immunization is particularly
attractive in cases where resources, like vaccines, are limited, as only a small proportion
of the population must be immunized to effectively reduce wider contagion [28].
An extensive literature on networks and immunizations has focused on evaluating
selection strategies [11,29,30]. The basic question is how to pick which actors in the
network should be treated. A common choice is to evaluate immunization strategies
using simulation (as we do in this paper), where a researcher stochastically spreads an
infection through the treated network, recording the outbreak size under different
strategies of node-immunization. The goal is to identify immunization strategies that
will reduce the spread of infection the most, given the number of actors that can be
treated (with limited time, money and so on).
One potential complication to identifying important actors is missing data. Many of
the network-based immunization strategies suggested by existing research rely on global
network measures, like betweenness and degree centrality, which assume that a
researcher can map out the full network of relations on the population of interest. This
is often not realized in practice, as studies are often subject to missing data [31,32].
Missing data will potentially alter the measurement of the network [33,34], and
consequently, the identification of important actors [12,13].
This article addresses the effectiveness of different targeted immunization strategies
under conditions of missing data, see Refs. [35] and [36] for recent calls to address
related problems. This is a pressing problem as some of the best immunization
strategies in fully-observed networks [12, 14, 16] are based on measures that are sensitive
to missing data [33,34,37]. For example, past work has found that measures like
betweenness, which are dependent on the full network structure, are often badly biased
when nodes are missing [33,38]. Thus, we may think that betweenness will be effective
at finding important actors to immunize when missing data is low, but may not fare so
well when levels of missing data are high. Alternatively, a strategy that is less effective
in a true (completely observed) network may be robust to missing data, making it a
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potentially attractive option when missing data is a known problem. A strategy is
effective to the extent that it reduces outbreak size at a given level of missing data. A
strategy is robust to the extent that its effectiveness is not reduced with increasing
levels of missing data. Thus, we suggest that most researchers ‘on the ground’ face a
tradeoff between effectiveness and robustness. This tradeoff has been largely
downplayed by past work, which has focused on the effectiveness of different options
under the assumption of complete (or full) network information. In this article, we
address the tradeoff between robustness and effectiveness directly by examining the
robustness of different immunization strategies to varying levels of missing data.
We begin the article by discussing the existing research on targeted immunization
strategies. We then turn to a simulation-based test of immunization strategies under
conditions of missing data.
Network-based immunization strategies
Immunization strategies work by identifying key nodes and immunizing them against
infection (thereby preventing them from infecting others). Different strategies use
different criteria to select the nodes to immunize. The question is which strategies are
most effective in terms of preventing, or mitigating outbreaks of contagion on a
population.
Two of the most commonly evaluated immunization strategies are degree and
betweenness immunization. With degree immunization, nodes are immunized if they
have many connections, or high degree centrality, and thus a higher chance of spreading
the infection to their neighbors [11, 12, 14, 15]. Betweenness immunization selects actors
for removal based on how crucial the actor is in connecting different communities (or
groups), directly measuring how many shortest transmission chains can be broken via
immunization [12,14,17].
Other studies have explored the effectiveness of stochastic approaches to identifying
important actors in the network. Stochastic immunization algorithms rely on the local
network, or neighborhood, of sampled nodes, rather than on global network data [18,39].
One commonly tested stochastic strategy is acquaintance immunization, which
immunizes those nodes frequently found to be neighbors of randomly selected
nodes [14,18,40]. This strategy locates high degree nodes by relying on the proportional
relationship between the degree of a node and the probability that it will be the
randomly selected neighbor of a randomly selected node [41]. Acquaintance
immunization is thus useful as it allows the researcher to find hubs in the network
without a costly and sometimes infeasible network census.
The problem of missing data in choosing an immunization
strategy
Past tests of these immunization strategies have almost uniformly assumed ideal
conditions, where there is no missing data. In the case of global network measures like
betweenness, this means having information on all nodes and all ties between nodes. In
the case of stochastic processes, like acquaintance immunization, this means having a
complete sampling frame and complete local network information for each sampled node.
However, in many cases it will be difficult to obtain complete network data. Missing
data can arise for a number of reasons. For example, a researcher may not have
sufficient time or resources to find and gather information about everyone in the
network, particularly if the network is large. Even respondents that are interviewed may
offer incomplete information about their social contacts, being prone to forgetfulness
and fatigue [31,42,43]. These issues are amplified in hidden, difficult to reach
populations, such as a network of drug users or sex workers [44–50].
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Missing data may have important consequences for choosing an immunization
strategy. First, missing nodes will generally be unavailable for immunization, even if
they could be identified (which would be difficult for most strategies). This is a problem
endemic to network intervention studies and is built in to our exploration of the effect
of missing data on immunization effectiveness. Second, missing data can affect the
measurement of network properties, like degree and betweenness [34]. The rank order of
nodes (from least to most important) may deviate from the true rank order on the
complete, but unknown, network [51,52]. Thus, among the set of nodes that can be
immunized (i.e., those who actually participate) one runs the risk of picking a
sub-optimal target set to be immunized.
We see similar issues with the stochastic strategies, like acquaintance immunization.
While stochastic strategies do not require global network data, and are thus often
touted as robust to missing data [14,19,40], implementing these algorithms in practice
still requires a comprehensive list of nodes from which to sample, as well as perfect local
information about the neighborhood of each sampled node. Thus, critical nodes that
would be selected by these local strategies can still be overlooked either because they
are missing from the local information of sampled nodes (and thus undiscoverable) or
because some of their neighborhood is missing and they are thus less likely to be
identified as critical compared to nodes whose neighborhoods are more heavily
represented. Therefore, even a “robust” strategy, like acquaintance immunization is
potentially affected by missing data.
These two ways that missing data may appear need not occur together. In certain
data collection scenarios, it may be be feasible to obtain a complete sampling frame and
accurate local information; in others, it may be possible to obtain one of these but not
the other, and in some scenarios it may impossible to obtain complete data for either
one. We will explore the effectiveness (in terms of reduction in outbreak size) of this
approach under different assumptions about data availability.
Accounting for missing data in immunization strategies
A limited number of studies have considered missing data problems related to network
contagion and immunization. Most of these studies have not tackled the problem of
targeted immunization problems directly, however. He´bert-Dufresne et al. [12], for
example, investigate the effectiveness of immunization strategies and their robustness
separately, testing effectiveness under the assumption of perfect data, and using the
Jaccard coefficient to test robustness of targeting. Gong et al. [20] address how the
effectiveness of an immunization strategy is affected by random network changes, but
still assumes perfect data about the modified network when calculating immunization
targets.
Another line of work examines the effect of missing data on objectives and metrics
related, but not equivalent to, targeted immunization. These include attack robustness
of networks [53,54], influence maximization [55], and identification of influential
spreaders [56]. See Ref. [57] for a discussion on the differences between influence
maximization and targeted immunization.
The two studies that are most closely related to our own both investigate the
effectiveness of targeted immunization strategies under specific sampling schemes. The
first is a study by Yang et al. [21] who examine the potential of immunization strategies
in the case of Fixed Choice Design (FCD) sampling. Fixed Choice Design puts limits on
the number of neighbors a node can have, creating bias in the observed network.
Measurement error of this sort can affect the targeting strategies, but only in a limited
way, as all nodes in the network are still assumed to be present and available for
immunization. In this way, Yang et al. capture the effect of missing edges but not
missing nodes, the focus of this study.
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Chen and Lu [13] similarly consider immunization strategies under a particular
sampling scheme, Respondent Driven Sampling (RDS) [47]. With RDS, a set of initial
seeds are recruited into the study; these initial seeds recruit others into the study, who
recruit others into the study and so on. Chen and Lu develop an algorithm to identify
which actors should be immunized under such sampling conditions. The analysis is
limited, however, to data collected via RDS, which does not cover the more general
problem of missing network data; additionally, they assume rather ideal conditions of
the RDS chain, where there is wide coverage of the population and no actors refuse to
participate.
In sum, past work has focused on specific sampling schemes, while relying on the
complete portion of the data to originate from an accurate process free from
complications. In this article, we move past previous research by directly examining the
effectiveness of targeted immunization strategies in reducing outbreak size under
conditions of missing data. We allow the missing data to exist anywhere in the network,
mimicking the scenario where pieces of the network are unobserved as actors are
unwilling or unable to participate in the study — rather than consider data based on
well-behaved sampling schemes. We also extend past work by considering the
mechanisms under which stochastic strategies are subject to missing data. More
substantively, we focus on the effectiveness/robustness tradeoff of different
immunization strategies, making it possible to see under what conditions different
strategies will be most effective at reducing outbreak size.
We now turn to testing the robustness and effectiveness of different immunization
strategies. We consider a range of missing data scenarios, from the ideal case of
complete information to more difficult cases where much of the network is not available.
Materials and methods
There are six basic steps to testing the robustness of different immunization strategies:
1) select a known, true network as a test case; 2) remove nodes from the network to
simulate conditions of missing data; 3) take partially-observed networks (from step 2)
and identify nodes to immunize under different strategies; 4) run multiple outbreak
simulations through the true network (from step 1) with selected nodes immunized
(from step 3); 5) repeat steps 1-4 many times for each condition of interest. 6) compare
the resulting estimates of outbreak size under each immunization strategy and level of
missing data.
Select known network as test case
Following past work on epidemics [39, 58], we use synthetic networks to test the validity
of different immunization strategies. We consider synthetic (generated) networks with
similar properties as the well known Colorado Springs high risk network [59]. The
population of interest in the Colorado Springs network included at-risk individuals for
HIV and HCV transmission, including drug injectors and sex workers. Researchers
attempted to identify the entire at-risk population in the city and include them in their
study. Ties are defined across several relationships: including close friendship, sexual
contact, and drug co-use [59]. Disease risk networks of persons who inject drugs are of
particular interest for several reasons. The sharing of injection drug apparatus is one of
the most prevalent transmission routes for HIV both in terms of transmission rate [60]
and also in terms of incidence rate among persons who inject drugs (PWID) [61].
Therefore, the threat to life caused by outbreaks within these populations is greater than
for many other types of outbreaks in other populations. Additionally, PWID are known
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to be a hidden population [47,62,63], thus the missing data treatment approach we
present here is of special interest in regards to immunizations within these populations.
In addition, we replicate our analyses using synthetic school networks. We generated
these school networks to have properties that match the friendship network structure of
a typical school collected as part of the well known National Longitudinal Study of
Adolescent to Adult Health (Add Health) [64]. Ties are based on self-reported friendship
nominations that were collected in the classroom [65]. The Add Health network
provides a case where the pathogen of interest requires close social contact, like drink
sharing or hand holding; this would fit infections like streptococcus or mononucleosis.
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Fig 1. Degree distribution and network structures based on the Colorado
Springs (i-ii) and Add Health (iii-iv) networks. In the visualization, a node’s
color corresponds to some additional individual attribute — gender for the Colorado
Springs network and school grade for the Add Health network — while a node’s size is
fixed by their degree. The Colorado Springs network is relatively well described through
its heterogeneous degree distributions with some additional structure (e.g. clustering)
due in part to gender. The Add Health network has a more homogeneous degree
distribution, but a clear modular structure that emerges since connections are more
likely within than across school grade. Note that the degree distributions are based on
the two empirically observed networks, one for Colorado Springs and one for Add
Health.
We use synthetic networks to control relevant features, while systematically varying
key network properties. From the Colorado Springs data, we generate three sets of
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networks sharing some basic features (e.g., composition, degree distribution, strength of
homophily on key attributes like gender and race), but each with different levels of
transitivity between sets. Transitivity is defined as the proportion of two-paths
(i→ j → k) that also have a direct path (i→ k). Transitivity is negatively related to
contagion potential [66, 67] and the Colorado Springs network we set out to emulate has
particularly high transitivity. We generate five thousand “high” transitivity networks,
each with transitivity constrained around 0.30, close to the true Colorado Springs
network, five thousand “medium” transitivity networks, with transitivity constrained
around 0.155, and five thousand “low” transitivity networks with transitivity
constrained around 0.01.
Synthetic networks are generated using exponential random graph models
(ERGM) [68]. All networks are undirected, unweighted, and have 1000 nodes. In each
case, the degree distribution is pulled from the original network, plotted in Fig. 1. For
each of the three network types (“low”, “medium” and “high” transitivity), we generate
5000 networks from the underlying model. In the Supporting Information (SI), we
replicate our analysis with other classes of synthetic networks selected from the targeted
immunization literature, to demonstrate comparable results and exemplify the
generality of our methodology.
Remove nodes to simulate conditions of missing data
To simulate conditions of missing data, we followed the standard procedure in the
literature: for each true network, G (five thousand per transitivity level), we removed a
portion of the nodes at random to form the observed network, G’. The removed nodes
were not present in the observed network [37,38]. The observed network (G′) is the
network from the point of view of the researcher and serves as input into the
immunization strategies.
Identify nodes to immunize under different strategies
In general, an immunization algorithm works by identifying the nodes which are most
central to the network or have a particular structural position which is considered to be
important for the flow of contagion. The nodes identified with the highest scores will be
the ones targeted for immunization in the subsequent outbreak simulations (with ties
broken randomly). We considered eight different immunization strategies. There were
three global strategies — degree, self-reported degree and betweenness — and one
stochastic strategy, acquaintance immunization, was used in four different variants. We
also considered random immunization as a baseline, where nodes were randomly
selected to be immunized. In addition, we also run simulations with no immunization,
to provide another point of comparison.
Random Immunization: Random immunization selects nodes at random from the
given node list of G′, which, from the perspective of an interventionist, should be
considered the sampling frame. Since nodes are missing from G’ at random, and
random immunization selects a random selection of nodes to immunize from the random
sample of observed nodes, random immunization of nodes from G’ is equivalent to
random immunization of nodes from the true network, G. Note that this would not be
the case with a non-random sample of observed nodes.
Degree Immunization: Degree immunization selects nodes based on their network
degree in G′ — the number of ties each node receives/sends according to observed
network data.
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Betweenness Immunization: Betweenness immunization targets nodes with the
highest betweenness centrality in G′. Betweenness centrality is the proportion of the
shortest paths between nodes in the network (geodesics) upon which a node lies
(counting as fractions of paths when there are multiple shortest paths between the same
pairs of nodes) [69,70]. This can be formally written as:
BC(v) =
∑
{u,w  V | u 6=v,w 6=v}
σu,v,w
σu,w
(1)
where v is an arbitrary node, {u,w  V | u 6= v, w 6= v} is the set of all pairs of nodes
u,w where neither u nor w equals v, σu,w is the total number of shortest paths between
u and w, and σu,v,w is the number of those paths which pass through v
Self-Reported Degree Immunization: Self-reported degree is an obvious
strategy that is frequently overlooked, yet it can often be straightforwardly implemented
and can directly tackle missing data in degree immunization. Self-reported degree
immunization targets nodes in the sample (the node list of G′) based on their true
degree (their degree in G), assuming nodes know their neighbors and faithfully report
their number of connections. This describes a scenario, where by survey or other query,
a limited amount of accurate egocentric data on a sampled subset of nodes can be
collected. This is a common assumption among most social network studies, including
those which explicitly acknowledge the difficulty of obtaining a network census and thus
do not presuppose complete network data, such as RDS studies [13,71,72] and
egocentric studies [73,74]. With complete data, this strategy is perfectly equivalent to
the degree immunization described above. With missing data, we do not have access to
the nodes outside of the sampling frame (and thus cannot immunize them) but missing
nodes are still counted as connections by their neighbors (as they would be on a
personal survey). Note also that access to this information does not require any contact
with nor information about the sampled nodes’ neighbors other than their existence.
Acquaintance Immunization: We used acquaintance immunization to test
stochastic immunization strategies. We offered a test with four different versions of
acquaintance immunization, with different assumptions about the information available
to the researcher. Each variant makes different assumptions about the completeness of
the sampling frame (G for true graph and G′ for known graph), as well as the level of
local information (again, G for true graph and G′ for known graph).
Acquaintance immunization operates under the “friendship paradox”, the principle
that if one randomly samples the network, nodes that are highly connected are more
likely to be neighbors of randomly sampled individuals [18,75]. Consequently, to
identify important nodes, the algorithm randomly samples a node, r, then randomly
samples a neighbor of r, node n, and adds one to the acquaintance score of n. If this
score increment causes n’s acquaintance score to go above some chosen threshold
(usually 1 or 2), then n is added to the list of structurally important nodes to immunize.
This process is iterated until v% of nodes have been identified as structurally important,
where v is the desired immunization level [40]. Following previous research [14], we used
a threshold of 2 for adding nodes to the list of nodes to immunize.
(G,G) Variant: We defined the (G,G) version of acquaintance immunization as the
case where both the node set for sampling and the local neighborhood information for
each sampled node come from the true network, G. The (G,G) version of the algorithm
is directly comparable to those used in existing literature without consideration of
missing data. The (G,G) version is applicable in certain limited cases where missing
data is a problem for global strategies, when there is neither the time nor resources to
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conduct collect fully saturated network data, but a complete sampling frame exists and
a limited number of surveys can be conducted accurately, such as in a school or a small
government with an accurate census. Regardless, including this variant allows us to
compare the best-case scenario of stochastic strategies to the global strategies.
(G′, G′) Variant: In the (G′, G′) variant, both the randomly sampled nodes and their
local neighborhood information come from the observed, incomplete network, G′ (not
the true network, G). Thus, only nodes in the observed network, G′, are available to be
sampled and are listed as neighbors of the sampled nodes. This also means that only
nodes in the observed network are able to be immunized. The (G′, G′) variant is the
most comparable to the global algorithms, as the process only depends on information
from the observed network data. More generally, we see the (G′, G′) variant as the most
realistic version of acquaintance immunization, especially with hidden populations.
(G′, G) Variant: The (G′, G) version tests the scenario where no complete sampling
frame exists, but perfect local information is attainable. Thus, the node set for a (G′, G)
version is incomplete, but the local information about the sampled nodes’ neighborhood
comes from the true network, G, which has complete information. This means that the
researcher is able to identify and immunize any neighbor of nodes in the sampling frame,
even if that node is not in the observed network, G′ (meaning no refusal of treatment).
This scenario exemplifies an ideal, theoretical case of using acquaintance immunization
for hidden or hard to reach populations. For instance, settings where the neighbors for
each node can be uniquely identified (even if they are not initially in the study, e.g.
with a phone number), where the sampled nodes’ trust, memory, and knowledge does
not restrict information about their neighbors, and where the locatability and trust of
the sampled nodes’ neighbors does not restrict the ability to treat those neighbors
(neither through absence nor refusal).
(G,G) Variant: The (G,G) variant is similar in concept to the (G′, G) version above
and assumes that the researcher’s sampling frame is initially incomplete, but since their
network information is valid it can be used to supplement the sampling frame. For
example, a researcher following an acquaintance immunization scheme is initially limited
to the incomplete sampling frame when selecting a random node, but that node (who is
undergoing a surveying process already) can inform the researchers of their neighbors.
In the (G,G) variant, we allowed nodes queried in the process to add their neighbors to
the sampling frame for the subsequent discoveries and immunizations. This variant
therefore leverages the immunization procedure to continue data collection and
continuously uncover missing data (if any).
Immunization and SIR infection model
The next step in the test took each version of the true network, G (from step 1),
immunized the nodes identified by each strategy for that version of G (from step 3) and
simulated epidemic dynamics through the treated (static) network. We considered 3
immunization levels: 5%, 10%, and 15%. For example, with the 10% immunization level,
100 people in a network with 1000 nodes were immunized, determined by the rank
ordering of important actors specific to that immunization strategy (if global), or the
selection of important nodes through random exploration (if stochastic). This
immunization is assumed to be 100% effective on the single contagion being modeled.
Once the important actors were immunized in their own copies of the original
network, we used Monte Carlo calculations of the Susceptible-Infectious-Recovered
(SIR) model to estimate the final outbreak size for each immunization strategy (for a
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particular parameter set) by running multiple groups of simple SIR simulations through
the treated networks. In SIR simulations, every infected node infect their susceptible
neighbours at rate β and recover at rate γ. The SIR model runs until there are no longer
any infected nodes. We assume the infection runs its course without further intervention.
This model was chosen for its simplicity and applicability to varied scenarios.
For our simulations, we made use of the exceptionally fast implementation by
St-Onge et al. [76]. For simplicity, we set time units to be equal to the expected
recovery time (such that γ = 1) and vary β over a large enough range to explore
outbreaks of varied sizes. In addition to these parameters, we also report the
corresponding R0 values defined as the average number of secondary cases by an
infectious individual in an otherwise susceptible population (the simulation software [76]
uses the average number of secondary cases caused by the second infectious individual).
More generally, the goal of our analysis is to examine the effect of missing data on
immunization strategies for a generalized outbreak model. Thus, our results are not
based on a single infection (e.g., HIV) but instead, we look at a range of cases where
each case could be thought of as a different type of infection, with its own infectiousness
and recovery rate. The epidemiological case could thus be anything transmitted over
network connections. The input parameters in the simulation are consistent with a
range of infections, such as HCV and HIV (lower infection potential) to varicella or
mumps (higher infection potential).
One common approach in the targeted-immunization literature is to consider only
large-scale outbreaks during this simulation process [12,14]. This method avoids issues
related to the frequently bimodal nature of SIR outbreak distributions, see Ref. [77] and
the SI, but fails close to the epidemic threshold when there is no systematic threshold to
be used. Instead, we were able to reach a tight confidence bound on the mean outbreak
size for each set of parameters we tested, despite the extreme variability of many
outbreak size distributions, by using 107 Monte Carlo simulations for each parameter
set. We spread these 107 simulations out over 5000 separate networks that we generated
with similar characteristics to reduce the risk of spurious results that can occur from
only testing on a single network or a small number of individual networks. Each of these
5000 networks was sampled to simulate missing data before removing nodes for each
strategy and for every immunization level; 2000 SIR simulations were then run for each
of these treated networks and the mean of these 2000 simulations was recorded and
placed in a distribution of means over all 5000 networks. The values we report are the
grand mean of these 5000 means. We separately recorded the size of each individual
outbreak and display some of these in the SI. We ran this process with the SIR model
for each new level of missing data, recalculation of centrality (or relevant measure), and
immunized target nodes, each time recording the size of the SIR outbreak. The means
are then compared between strategies at given levels of missing data to determine their
relative effectiveness. All comparisons discussed in the results were verified with t-tests
using the distributions of means (full significance tests in the SI).
Results
Simulations on the Colorado Springs network
Our first set of results is based on the synthetic “medium transitivity” Colorado Springs
network. We found unsurprisingly that random immunization was the worst strategy at
every level of missing data and immunization coverage (see Fig. 2). All targeted
strategies reduce outbreak size further than random immunization, despite random
immunization being perfectly robust to missing data (as a random choice of nodes to
immunize from a random sample of nodes is still perfectly random). This is an
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Fig 2. Effectiveness of immunization strategies at different levels of missing
data and immunization coverage. Data points represent the difference in the mean
final outbreak size of random immunization and each targeted immunization strategy
(in percent of the population). Error bars were omitted because marker size was larger
than 95% confidence intervals on the mean (5000 individual networks with 2000 SIR
simulations for each). With β = 0.95, this ensemble of networks had a measured R0
value of 4.85 (computationally assessed [76]). When no immunization was applied, the
mean outbreak size was 58.12% of the population. Data points were omitted if a
strategy was ever unable to converge to that level of immunization coverage, i.e., when
there were not enough candidates to immunize. The legend lists all strategies tested:
betweenness (Bet), degree (Deg), self-reported degree (S.R.D), and all variants of
aquaintance immunization (Acq(G′, G′), Acq(G′, G), Acq(G,G), and Acq(G,G))
important finding: even at extremely high levels of missing nodes (e.g., 80% missing),
targeted immunization was still preferable to random immunization by a considerable
margin. In fact, random immunization had significantly higher outbreak levels than
every other strategy, under every possible condition.
Degree, self-reported degree, and betweenness immunization all outperformed
random immunization, but also showed deteriorating effectiveness as missing data levels
increased. These strategies were effective (i.e., low outbreak size) when missing data
were low, with worse performance as missing data increased (see panel i or ii in Fig. 2).
For example, at 5% immunization, the expected outbreak size under degree
immunization went from around 17% with no missing data to 26% with 80% missing;
with 10% immunization, the outbreak size increased from 4% to 24%. This also meant
that the benefit of increasing immunization coverage (e.g., moving from 5% to 10%
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coverage) were higher when missing data were low.
The global strategies of betweenness, degree and self-reported degree outperformed
the stochastic strategies, based on acquaintance immunization, only at low levels of
missing data. Indeed, the global strategies were initially superior relative to
acquaintance immunization, but rapidly became less effective as missing data increased,
whereas (G′, G) lost its effectiveness more slowly, the (G,G) lines were flat and (G,G)
strategy actually improved slightly. The crossover point differed across the different
values of immunization coverage, but all fell between 50% and 80% missing data. As the
proportion of immunization coverage was reduced, the stochastic measures did not
surpass the global strategies until higher levels of missing data were reached since the
effect of missing data on the global strategies was weaker. In general, however, we saw
that the relative ranking of the strategies was quite consistent at the highest and lowest
levels of missing data.
Figure 2 also highlights a more surprising result: (G,G), which starts with an
initially incomplete sampling frame but updates it when acquaintance immunization
leads to the discovery of new nodes, was as effective or better than (G,G), the
equivalent strategy with complete information. This result held even at extremely high
levels of missing data and low levels of immunizations. In fact, the (G,G) variant was
found to actually increase in effectiveness as levels of missing data increase. This most
likely stems from the fact that, by coupling data discovery with acquaintance
immunization, (G,G) discovers important nodes that were initially missed while
ignoring lower degree nodes. Indeed, if the initial data collection missed a central node
of high degree, the acquaintance immunization is likely to find that node even when
starting with an incomplete sampling frame. Therefore, while an updating (G,G) with
5% level of immunization is unlikely to fully recover an 80% level of missing data, it will
recover the most important pieces of missing data. For example, with the medium
transitivity networks at 80% missing data, we observed that by the point in the (G,G)
acquaintance process where the desired 10% of nodes to target had been identified, the
sample of nodes had become positively biased towards high degree nodes, with a mean
degree of 9.7 compared to the overall mean degree of the network of 8.46.
The results for the low and high transitivity networks, presented in Figs. 3, were
generally consistent with the medium transitivity results. One key difference was that
(G,G) did not improve with missing data on networks with low transitivity, suggesting
the relevance of transitivity and/or outbreak size for targeted data recovery. Still, all
targeted strategies outperformed random immunization, while degree and betweenness
were the optimal strategies up to a threshold of missing data between 40% and 80%,
where acquaintance immunization, (G′, G), (G,G), or (G,G), became the best choice.
Altogether, the results so far summarize two of our main findings. First, there exists
a threshold of missing data over which local stochastic strategies like acquaintance
immunization outperformed global strategies based on network centrality metrics.
Second, acquaintance immunization strategies which discover missing nodes adaptively
are just as effective or better than equivalent strategies with complete data.
Additional analyses
Our first set of additional analyses studied the low, medium, and high transitivity
variants of the Colorado Springs network over a wide range of input parameters. We
systematically varied the level of transmissibility in the simulation, allowing β to range
from 0.2 to 1.7, a range of values higher and lower than that used in the main results
(0.95). These β values lead to R0 values in line with infections as diverse as Hepatitis C
to mumps. The results, presented in the SI, suggest that the level of infectiousness does
not dramatically affect the relative ranking of the immunization strategies.
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Fig 3. Effectiveness on high and low transitivity networks. We use the same
visualization scheme as in Fig. 2 and show results for the medium immunization
coverage of 10% on networks based on the Colorado Springs data with high and low
transitivity. For the value of β = 0.95 used in these tests: the ensemble of high
transitivity networks (i) had a measured R0 value of 4.64 and a mean outbreak size of
52.58% of the population with no immunization; the ensemble of low transitivity
networks (ii) had a measured R0 value of 6.98 and a mean outbreak size of 65.87% of
the population with no immunization. The legend lists all strategies tested:
betweenness (Bet), degree (Deg), self-reported degree (S.R.D), and all variants of
aquaintance immunization (Acq(G′, G′), Acq(G′, G), Acq(G,G), and Acq(G,G))
The second set of additional analyses extends the results using the Add Health
network of friendships between adolescents in school. The analysis allows us to
generalize the results to networks with very different structural features, and where
different kinds of pathogens (such as mononucleosis) might spread. As shown in Fig. 1,
the Add Health networks lack a long tail for the degree distribution; unlike the
Colorado Springs networks, a few actors do not disproportionately determine the
structure of the school networks.
Results using the Add Health network are shown in Fig. 4 and feature some
important differences from our previous results. The targeted immunization strategies
still all improved on the performance of random immunization, but here the reduction
in outbreak size was smaller than in the Colorado Springs networks. For example, in the
Add Health network with 10% immunized, 40% missing and β set to 0.95, degree
centrality yielded a 5% lower final outbreak size than random immunization; compare
this to a 14% difference in the Colorado Springs network (medium transitivity). This is
the case, in part, because the Add Health network has few (or no) extremely central
nodes. This means that the most central nodes have only marginally higher centrality
than less central nodes. Thus it can be harder to select who should be immunized
(especially with missing data), reducing the returns to targeted immunization in such
cases.
The structure of the Add Health network also affected some of the specific findings
related to (G,G). In the Add Health network, the (G,G) strategy sometimes performed
worse than (G,G), specifically at higher levels of infectiousness. This observation again
suggests that low infectiousness might be a key criteria for the targeted (G,G) to
outperform the complete information of (G,G), but also stresses the importance of
central hubs and degree heterogeneity.
Finally, an extensive comparison of the relative performance of (G,G) and (G,G)
under different values of infectiousness and under different network structures is shown
in Fig. 5. These results confirmed our previous observations: The targeted data recovery
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scheme implemented by (G,G) performed better when infectiousness was low and the
network structure featured significant degree heterogeneity. Most likely, this stems from
the fact that targeted data recovery will find central nodes if those are also high-degree
nodes, and that weak epidemics will be concentrated around these central hubs. When
facing an outbreak close to its epidemic threshold on heterogeneous networks, we
therefore expect that an intervention using an incomplete sampling frame and the
targeted data recovery scheme of (G,G) would outperform an equivalent intervention
using a known and complete census. That being said, at extremely low transmission
rate (β → 0) both strategies must be equivalent since outbreaks are simply impossible.
To summarize our results, the rank ordering of the strategies at different levels of
missing data was found to be mostly independent of network structure and transmission
rate. Similarly, acquaintance immunization strategies were found to be significantly
more robust to missing data than the typical benchmark strategies requiring global
information. In particular, acquaintance immunization that leverage the intervention for
targeted data recovery were found to improve with higher levels of missing data, unlike
any other approaches.
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Fig 4. Effectiveness on Add Health networks over a range of transmission
rates. We use the same visualization scheme as in Fig. 2 and the medium
immunization coverage of 10% on networks based on a typical school network from the
Add Health study. We varied β to produce both small and large outbreak sizes. For
panel (i), the measured value of R0 was 1.40, and the mean outbreak size with no
immunization was 11.12% of the population. For panel (ii), the measured value of R0
was 3.34, and the mean outbreak size with no immunization was 75.68%. For panel (iii),
the measured value of R0 was 3.84, and the mean outbreak size with no immunization
was 86.23%.The legend lists all strategies tested: betweenness (Bet), degree (Deg),
self-reported degree (S.R.D), and all variants of aquaintance immunization (Acq(G′, G′),
Acq(G′, G), Acq(G,G), and Acq(G,G))
May 18, 2020 15/23
16
0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
β
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
S
A
cq
(G
,G
)
−
S
A
cq
(G
,G
)
(%
)
Add Health Networks
(i)
0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
β
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
S
A
cq
(G
,G
)
−
S
A
cq
(G
,G
)
(%
)
Medium Transitivity Colorado Springs Networks
(ii)
0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
β
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
S
A
cq
(G
,G
)
−
S
A
cq
(G
,G
)
(%
)
Low Transitivity Colorado Springs Networks
(iii)
0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75
β
−1.0
−0.5
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
S
A
cq
(G
,G
)
−
S
A
cq
(G
,G
)
(%
)
High Transitivity Colorado Springs Networks
(iv)
Fig 5. We examine the comparative effectiveness of the updating- sample
strategy (Acq(G,G)) versus the strategy that has access to a complete
census (Acq(G,G)) in terms of the difference in their outbreak size (both measured in
percent of network infected). This comparison is assessed at the highest level of missing
data, over a range of β to see how this comparative effectiveness varies with the regime
of transmission probability. The immunization level for all tests shown here is 10%. In
panel (i), the measured value of R0 ranged from 1.40 to 3.84. In panel (ii), the measured
values for R0 ranged from 2.91 to 5.15. In panel (iii), the measured values for R0 ranged
from 3.49 to 7.79. In panel (iv), the measured values for R0 ranged from 2.81 to 4.95.
Discussion
In this paper, we have produced and implemented a method of comparing both global
and stochastic targeted immunization strategies under conditions of imperfect data.
Nearly two decades of research suggest that these types of strategies would be of
considerable help in reducing the spread of contagion. Our research represents an
important step in reconciling past research with the common reality of imperfect
network census coverage — introducing a method to formally examine the intuitive
notion that strategies which perform well under perfect conditions may be ineffective
when there is missing data. While missing data is ubiquitous in network science, this
reconciliation is especially important in contexts where data collection is difficult, such
as when dealing with vulnerable hidden populations, networks based on unobtrusive
observation, and in projects with limited resources.
Our most consistent finding is the clear superiority of targeted immunization over
random immunization, even at very high levels of missing data (e.g., 80% missing
nodes). This suggests that targeted immunization strategies are useful even in cases
where the prospects for complete network data are relatively poor — a positive sign for
the applicability of targeted immunization strategies.
We also find that missing data generally leads to higher outbreak levels, with some
strategies more affected by missing data than others. For example, betweenness and
both degree strategies perform best at low levels of missing data, but tend to converge
with other strategies as missing data increases. Additionally, at very high levels of
missing data, our three variants of acquaintance immunization — (G′, G), (G,G) and
(G,G) — outstrip both degree strategies and betweenness immunization and have the
lowest outbreak sizes relative to other strategies.
Importantly, the variant (G,G) which couples immunization with additional data
collection, often performs as well or better than acquaintance immunization with
complete data (G,G), while relying on nodes in the incomplete sampling frame. This
important result stems from the fact that the targeted immunization procedure is
leveraged by (G,G) as a targeted data recovery scheme. Moreover, this strategy was the
only one that was able to perform better with higher levels of missing data. This result
opens up a promising new avenue of research for targeted data recovery in networks
with missing data, an idea which could be powerful even beyond immunization
problems. And at the very least, this idea stresses the importance of at least
acknowledging that the available data might be incomplete.
Overall, while some strategies are more sensitive to missing data, they still may be
an optimal choice over more robust strategies. This is the case as the less robust
strategies tended to be more effective when missing data were low. We claim the
following. First, the relative effectiveness of an immunization strategy with full network
knowledge does not accurately predict its relative effectiveness with incomplete data.
Second, immunization strategies which do not need global data may still be affected by
incomplete sampling frames and local data. Third, even when stochastic strategies use
perfect information, a less robust strategy, like betweenness, may be more effective at
many levels of missing data and immunization coverage. Finally, the relative
effectiveness of a robust strategy compared to a non-robust strategy is context specific.
The choice is rarely so simple as global versus stochastic, with the optimal strategy
depending heavily on the level of missing data and the immunization coverage.
Our results are based on a wide range of scenarios, but we hope to see future work
extend our analysis, considering other immunization strategies, different network
topologies, different outbreak models, coevolution of outbreaks and interventions,
missing data related to the infection status of participants, and other different types of
missing data including non-random missing nodes and edges [32]. Our method is
designed with versatility in mind, and can be easily generalized to have the complete
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portion of the data originate from any sampling process. It is also easy to accommodate
a wide variety of biases and other complications. This allows our method to address the
larger problem of immunization of partially-observed networks. Betweenness centrality,
for example, is difficult to measure accurately when the network is small and the
missing nodes are central to the network [78], and may prove ineffective as an
immunization strategy under such conditions. Future work should thus consider the
effect of missing central nodes on the effectiveness of different immunization strategies.
There are a number of practical implications for our study. Researchers “in the field”
should, ideally, pay attention to both the effectiveness and robustness of the proposed
immunization strategy. A researcher should not necessarily avoid a strategy that is
affected by missing data (like degree or betweenness) as it still may be the best overall
choice, better than more robust strategies. While our model still involves a number of
simplifications, a researcher could use our results as a rough guide to consider this
tradeoff. Armed with local knowledge of their particular population, sampling methods,
and immunization logistics, including how the contagion spreads, the nature of the
missing data, and the nature of what constitutes an immunization, one could adapt our
methodology with more specific models for the outbreak (e.g. Refs. [79, 80]), for the
missing data (e.g. types [32,48,81] or estimates [45,82,83]), and for an immunization
campaign (e.g. incorporating imperfect immunization and ongoing immunization during
an epidemic) to determine an optimized subset of nodes to immunize. The hope, more
generally, is that a team designing an intervention in a real-world scenario could use our
results (and similar/future work) to inform both the data collection and intervention
campaign. To this end we have made the code used to produce these simulations
publicly available.
Data availability
Data and codes are available at: https://github.com/sfrosenb/
sfrosenb-Immunization_Strategies_in_Networks_with_Missing_Data.
Acknowledgments
This work was supported by the National Institute of General Medical Sciences of the
National Institutes of Health (Grant No. P20 GM130461), the National Institutes of
Health 1P20 GM125498-01 Centers of Biomedical Research Excellence Award, and the
Rural Drug Addiction Research Center at the University of Nebraska-Lincoln. S.F.R. is
supported as a Fellow of the National Science Foundation under NRT award
DGE-1735316. The authors acknowledge the Vermont Advanced Computing Core at
the University of Vermont for providing High Performance Computing resources,
Guillaume St-Onge for providing the simulation software as well as Andrew Becker and
Jane Adams for their useful comments. The primary author would also like to thank a
number of mentors for early guidance in this project including Patrick Habecker,
Elspeth Ready, Kirk Dombrowski, Alan Jamieson, and Andrew Cognard-Black.
References
1. Gomes MF, y Piontti AP, Rossi L, Chao D, Longini I, Halloran ME, et al.
Assessing the international spreading risk associated with the 2014 West African
Ebola outbreak. PLoS currents. 2014;6.
2. Baraba´si AL. Network science. Cambridge university press; 2016.
May 18, 2020 18/23
3. Shao C, Ciampaglia GL, Varol O, Yang KC, Flammini A, Menczer F. The spread
of low-credibility content by social bots. Nature communications. 2018;9(1):4787.
4. Bavelas A. A mathematical model for group structures. Human organization.
1948;7(3):16.
5. Morris M. Epidemiology and social networks: Modeling structured diffusion.
Sociological methods & research. 1993;22(1):99–126.
6. Moore C, Newman ME. Epidemics and percolation in small-world networks.
Physical Review E. 2000;61(5):5678.
7. Corley Jr H, Chang H. Finding the n most vital nodes in a flow network.
Management Science. 1974;21(3):362–364.
8. Hethcote HW, Yorke JA, Nold A. Gonorrhea modeling: a comparison of control
methods. Mathematical Biosciences. 1982;58(1):93–109.
9. Klovdahl AS. Social networks and the spread of infectious diseases: the AIDS
example. Social science & medicine. 1985;21(11):1203–1216.
10. Albert R, Jeong H, Baraba´si AL. Error and attack tolerance of complex networks.
nature. 2000;406(6794):378.
11. Pastor-Satorras R, Vespignani A. Immunization of complex networks. Physical
review E. 2002;65(3):036104.
12. He´bert-Dufresne L, Allard A, Young JG, Dube´ LJ. Global efficiency of local
immunization on complex networks. Scientific reports. 2013;3:2171.
13. Chen S, Lu X. An immunization strategy for hidden populations. Scientific
reports. 2017;7(1):3268.
14. Salathe´ M, Jones JH. Dynamics and control of diseases in networks with
community structure. PLoS computational biology. 2010;6(4):e1000736.
15. Schneider CM, Mihaljev T, Herrmann HJ. Inverse targeting—An effective
immunization strategy. EPL (Europhysics Letters). 2012;98(4):46002.
16. Masuda N. Immunization of networks with community structure. New Journal of
Physics. 2009;11(12):123018.
17. Schneider CM, Mihaljev T, Havlin S, Herrmann HJ. Suppressing epidemics with
a limited amount of immunization units. Physical Review E. 2011;84(6):061911.
18. Cohen R, Havlin S, Ben-Avraham D. Efficient immunization strategies for
computer networks and populations. Physical review letters. 2003;91(24):247901.
19. Ke H, Yi T. Immunization for scale-free networks by random walker. Chinese
Physics. 2006;15(12):2782.
20. Gong K, Tang M, Hui PM, Zhang HF, Younghae D, Lai YC. An efficient
immunization strategy for community networks. PloS one. 2013;8(12):e83489.
21. Yang Y, McKhann A, Chen S, Harling G, Onnela JP. Efficient vaccination
strategies for epidemic control using network information. Epidemics.
2019;27:115–122.
May 18, 2020 19/23
22. Ajenjo MC, Woeltje KF, Babcock HM, Gemeinhart N, Jones M, Fraser VJ.
Influenza vaccination among healthcare workers: ten-year experience of a large
healthcare organization. Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology.
2010;31(3):233–240.
23. Bansal S, Pourbohloul B, Meyers LA. A comparative analysis of influenza
vaccination programs. PLoS medicine. 2006;3(10):e387.
24. Hunter RF, de la Haye K, Murray JM, Badham J, Valente TW, Clarke M, et al.
Social network interventions for health behaviours and outcomes: A systematic
review and meta-analysis. PLoS medicine. 2019;16(9).
25. An W. Peer effects on adolescent smoking and social network-based interventions.
Dissertation, Department of Sociology, Harvard University; 2011.
26. Schneider JA, Zhou AN, Laumann EO. A new HIV prevention network approach:
sociometric peer change agent selection. Social science & medicine.
2015;125:192–202.
27. Valente TW, Vlahov D. Selective risk taking among needle exchange participants:
implications for supplemental interventions. American journal of public health.
2001;91(3):406.
28. Kupferschmidt K. Plan to use second Ebola vaccine sparks debate. Science.
2019;364(6447).
29. Cohen R, Havlin S. Complex networks: structure, robustness and function.
Cambridge university press; 2010.
30. Wang Z, Bauch CT, Bhattacharyya S, d’Onofrio A, Manfredi P, Perc M, et al.
Statistical physics of vaccination. Physics Reports. 2016;664:1–113.
31. Marsden PV. Network data and measurement. Annual review of sociology.
1990;16(1):435–463.
32. Kossinets G. Effects of missing data in social networks. Social networks.
2006;28(3):247–268.
33. Borgatti SP, Carley KM, Krackhardt D. On the robustness of centrality measures
under conditions of imperfect data. Social networks. 2006;28(2):124–136.
34. Smith JA, Moody J. Structural effects of network sampling coverage I: Nodes
missing at random. Social networks. 2013;35(4):652–668.
35. Silk MJ. The next steps in the study of missing individuals in networks: a
comment on Smith et al.(2017). Social Networks. 2018;52:37–41.
36. Pellis L, Ball F, Bansal S, Eames K, House T, Isham V, et al. Eight challenges
for network epidemic models. Epidemics. 2015;10:58–62.
37. Costenbader E, Valente TW. The stability of centrality measures when networks
are sampled. Social networks. 2003;25(4):283–307.
38. Borgatti SP, Everett MG. A graph-theoretic perspective on centrality. Social
networks. 2006;28(4):466–484.
39. Ma J, van den Driessche P, Willeboordse FH. The importance of contact network
topology for the success of vaccination strategies. Journal of theoretical biology.
2013;325:12–21.
May 18, 2020 20/23
40. Madar N, Kalisky T, Cohen R, Ben-avraham D, Havlin S. Immunization and
epidemic dynamics in complex networks. The European Physical Journal B.
2004;38(2):269–276.
41. Newman ME. The structure and function of complex networks. SIAM review.
2003;45(2):167–256.
42. Killworth PD, Bernard HR. Informant accuracy in social network data II.
Human Communication Research. 1977;4(1):3–18.
43. Bell DC, Belli-McQueen B, Haider A. Partner naming and forgetting: recall of
network members. Social networks. 2007;29(2):279–299.
44. Butts CT. Network inference, error, and informant (in) accuracy: a Bayesian
approach. social networks. 2003;25(2):103–140.
45. McCarty C, Killworth PD, Bernard HR, Johnsen EC, Shelley GA. Comparing
two methods for estimating network size. Human organization. 2001;60(1):28–39.
46. Merli MG, Moody J, Smith J, Li J, Weir S, Chen X. Challenges to recruiting
population representative samples of female sex workers in China using
Respondent Driven Sampling. Social Science & Medicine. 2015;125:79–93.
47. Heckathorn DD. Respondent-driven sampling: a new approach to the study of
hidden populations. Social problems. 1997;44(2):174–199.
48. Ghani A, Donnelly C, Garnett G. Sampling biases and missing data in
explorations of sexual partner networks for the spread of sexually transmitted
diseases. Statistics in medicine. 1998;17(18):2079–2097.
49. Costenbader EC, Astone NM, Latkin CA. The dynamics of injection drug users’
personal networks and HIV risk behaviors. Addiction. 2006;101(7):1003–1013.
50. Mouw T, Verdery AM. Network sampling with memory: a proposal for more
efficient sampling from social networks. Sociological methodology.
2012;42(1):206–256.
51. Ghoshal G, Baraba´si AL. Ranking stability and super-stable nodes in complex
networks. Nature communications. 2011;2:394.
52. Martin C, Niemeyer P. Estimating the sensitivity of centrality measures w.r.t.
measurement errors. ArXiv. 2017;abs/1704.01045.
53. Jun L, Jun W, Yong L, Hong-Zhong D, Yue-Jin T. Optimal attack strategy in
random scale-free networks based on incomplete information. Chinese Physics
Letters. 2011;28(6):068902.
54. Shang Y. Subgraph robustness of complex networks under attacks. IEEE
Transactions on Systems, Man, and Cybernetics: Systems. 2017;49(4):821–832.
55. Erkol S¸, Faqeeh A, Radicchi F. Influence maximization in noisy networks. EPL
(Europhysics Letters). 2018;123(5):58007.
56. Kitsak M, Gallos LK, Havlin S, Liljeros F, Muchnik L, Stanley HE, et al.
Identification of influential spreaders in complex networks. Nature physics.
2010;6(11):888.
57. Holme P. Three faces of node importance in network epidemiology: Exact results
for small graphs. Physical Review E. 2017;96(6):062305.
May 18, 2020 21/23
58. Hartvigsen G, Dresch J, Zielinski A, Macula A, Leary C. Network structure, and
vaccination strategy and effort interact to affect the dynamics of influenza
epidemics. Journal of theoretical biology. 2007;246(2):205–213.
59. Klovdahl AS, Potterat JJ, Woodhouse DE, Muth JB, Muth SQ, Darrow WW.
Social networks and infectious disease: The Colorado Springs study. Social
science & medicine. 1994;38(1):79–88.
60. Gerberding JL. Incidence and prevalence of human immunodeficiency virus,
hepatitis B virus, hepatitis C virus, and cytomegalovirus among health care
personnel at risk for blood exposure: final report from a longitudinal study.
Journal of infectious diseases. 1994;170(6):1410–1417.
61. Mathers BM, Degenhardt L, Phillips B, Wiessing L, Hickman M, Strathdee SA,
et al. Global epidemiology of injecting drug use and HIV among people who
inject drugs: a systematic review. The Lancet. 2008;372(9651):1733–1745.
62. Wiebel WW. Identifying and gaining access to hidden populations. NIDA Res
Monogr. 1990;98:4–11.
63. Heckathorn DD. Respondent-driven sampling II: deriving valid population
estimates from chain-referral samples of hidden populations. Social problems.
2002;49(1):11–34.
64. Harris KM, Halpern CT, Whitsel E, Hussey J, Tabor J, Entzel P, et al. The
national longitudinal study of adolescent to adult health: Research design. See
http://www cpc unc edu/projects/addhealth/design (accessed 9 April 2015).
2009;.
65. Bearman P, Moody J, Stovel K. The Add Health network variable codebook.
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. 1997;.
66. Miller JC. Percolation and epidemics in random clustered networks. Physical
Review E. 2009;80(2):020901.
67. Smith JA, Burow J. Using ego network data to inform agent-based models of
diffusion. Sociological Methods & Research. 2018; p. 0049124118769100.
68. Handcock MS, Hunter DR, Butts CT, Goodreau SM, Krivitsky PN, Morris M.
ergm: Fit, Simulate and Diagnose Exponential-Family Models for Networks; 2018.
Available from: https://CRAN.R-project.org/package=ergm.
69. Freeman LC. A set of measures of centrality based on betweenness. Sociometry.
1977; p. 35–41.
70. Brandes U. A faster algorithm for betweenness centrality. Journal of
mathematical sociology. 2001;25(2):163–177.
71. Salganik MJ, Heckathorn DD. Sampling and estimation in hidden populations
using respondent-driven sampling. Sociological methodology. 2004;34(1):193–240.
72. Wejnert C. 3. An Empirical Test of Respondent-Driven Sampling: Point
Estimates, Variance, Degree Measures, and Out-of-Equilibrium Data. Sociological
methodology. 2009;39(1):73–116.
73. Burt RS. Network items and the general social survey. Social networks.
1984;6(4):293–339.
May 18, 2020 22/23
74. Marsden PV. Egocentric and sociocentric measures of network centrality. Social
networks. 2002;24(4):407–422.
75. Feld SL. Why your friends have more friends than you do. American Journal of
Sociology. 1991;96(6):1464–1477.
76. St-Onge G, Young JG, He´bert-Dufresne L, Dube´ LJ. Efficient sampling of
spreading processes on complex networks using a composition and rejection
algorithm. Computer Physics Communications. 2019;240:30–37.
77. Newman ME. Spread of epidemic disease on networks. Physical review E.
2002;66(1):016128.
78. Smith JA, Moody J, Morgan JH. Network sampling coverage II: The effect of
non-random missing data on network measurement. Social networks.
2017;48:78–99.
79. Dombrowski K, Khan B, Habecker P, Hagan H, Friedman SR, Saad M. The
interaction of risk network structures and virus natural history in the
non-spreading of HIV among people who inject drugs in the early stages of the
epidemic. AIDS and Behavior. 2017;21(4):1004–1015.
80. Morita S. Six susceptible-infected-susceptible models on scale-free networks.
Scientific reports. 2016;6:22506.
81. Laumann EO, Marsden PV, Prensky D. The boundary specification problem in
network analysis. Research methods in social network analysis. 1989;61:87.
82. Habecker P, Dombrowski K, Khan B. Improving the network scale-up estimator:
Incorporating means of sums, recursive back estimation, and sampling weights.
PloS one. 2015;10(12):e0143406.
83. Bernstein MS, Bakshy E, Burke M, Karrer B. Quantifying the invisible audience
in social networks. In: Proceedings of the SIGCHI conference on human factors
in computing systems. ACM; 2013. p. 21–30.
May 18, 2020 23/23
